Deep neural networks (DNN) have been a de facto standard for nowadays biometric recognition solutions. A serious, but still overlooked problem in these DNN-based recognition systems is their vulnerability against adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks can easily cause the output of a DNN system to greatly distort with only tiny changes in its input. Such distortions can potentially lead to an unexpected match between a valid biometric and a synthetic one constructed by a strategic attacker, raising security issue. In this work, we show how this issue can be resolved by learning robust biometric features through a deep, informationtheoretic framework, which builds upon the recent deep variational information bottleneck method but is carefully adapted to biometric recognition tasks. Empirical evaluation demonstrates that our method not only offers stronger robustness against adversarial attacks but also provides better recognition performance over state-of-the-art approaches.
Introduction
Let us consider the following scenario in real-world biometric recognition. In particular, we will be focusing on the case of deep biometric recognition, where deep neural network (DNN) is employed as flexible feature extractors in the database. Recognition is then done by comparing the distance D between two biometric x 1 , x 2 in the feature space:
where y denotes the identity (class) of the biometric, T is the decision threshold, f : R K → R k is the DNN used to extract features and D(·, ·) is some distance metric in the feature space (e.g Euclidean distance or cosine distance). Therefore two biometrics are considered to be matched with each other if the distance between their features falls within T . Now assume that a malicious attacker, who is also a valid user in the system, is going to 'masquerade' some other person in the * corresponding author same system. The question here is: can the attacker modify his own biometric image x with only little efforts ∆x, so that the system will mismatch him as some other user in the same system? If the answer is yes, the attacker can then be granted full authority belonged to that user --a security disaster.
The above scenario is indeed not highly hypothetical due to the advent of adversarial attacks in recent machine learning. Adversarial attacks are algorithms designed to strike the stability of neural networks. Such algorithms can cause the output of a neural network to greatly distort with only tiny variations in its input, leading to sub-optimal or even completely wrong decisions [Szegedy et al., 2013] . For example, under adversarial attacks, a well-trained deep neural network can be fooled by a modified cookie picture and ridiculously classifies it as a dog face. The source of adversarial attacks is still an open problem [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016] , but one thing is clear to us: it alerts us to blindly adopting DNN in those security-sensitive applications. Back to biometric recognition, if the output distortion caused by adversarial attacks are so large that it incurs a unexpected match between the attacker's biometric and that of other users, security issue raises. Therefore, while offering human-surpassing recognition performance, the robustness of existing DNN-based recognition systems [Sun et al., 2014; Amos et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2015] are indeed susceptible and may need careful re-examination.
Very few efforts have been devoted to study the effect of adversarial attacks in biometric recognition. In this work, we investigate how adversarial attacks can raise serious security problems in existing deep biometric recognition systems as well as exploring its solution. We begin by extending existing adversarial attacking algorithm from label space to feature space and then use it to attack DNN-based biometric recognition system. We subsequently show that how this kind of attacks can be effectively defended by a new deep feature extraction framework, which is evolved from the recent deep variational information bottleneck method [Alemi et al., 2017] but is augmented with two improvements: a novel sphere projection operation and an adversarial learning strategy. The resultant method, which is coined as deep variational sphere projection (DVSP), provides both strong robustness to adversarial attacks as well as satisfactory recognition performance, hence is more preferable in real-world applications, as we confirm by extensive experiments.
The rest of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the problem as well as briefly introduces the adversarial algorithm used to attack DNN-based biometric recognition system. Section 3 elaborates the details of the proposed DVSP framework. Section 4 conducts a set of experiments on both the toy MNIST dataset and the real-world LFW dataset. We finally conclude the paper in Section 5.
Problem formulation
Below, we first briefly revisit the background knowledge of adversarial attacks in recent machine learning research, then illustrate how to extend these attacks to the context of biometric recognition, which triggers the motivation of this work.
Adversarial attacks in label space
Generally speaking, given a classifier f (·) and two input images x 1 , x 2 from different classes (e.g dogs v.s cats), adversarial attacks seek x 1 's minimal modified versionx 1 such that it can cause f (·) to mis-classifyx 1 as x 2 . It can be formulated as the following constrained optimization problem:
where d(·, ·) are some metric that measures the changes in the classifier's input space. We say that f (·) is vulnerable under adversarial attacks if d(x 1 , x 1 ) for the foundx is small. Diverse attacking algorithms have been developed under different metric d; see e.g literature [Yuan et al., 2019] for a recent review. In this work, we mainly focus on the case d(x, x) = x − x 2 due to its popularity and simplicity.
Adversarial attacks in feature space
Existing works in adversarial attacks mainly consider the classification scenario where f (x) outputs the class label i.e it is defined in the label space. However it is indeed straightforward to extend them to the feature space. To see this, we first relax (2) as:
where D(·, ·) is a distance metric in the output space and T is a threshold. One can see that if we broaden the family of f (·) from classifier to feature extractor and pick appropriate distance metric D(·, ·) we can immediately adapt existing adversarial attacks to feature space. Taking Carlini-Wanger attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017] , one of the most powerful adversarial attacking algorithm as example, it originally findsx 1 by optimizing a regularized optimization problem (assuming that d(x, x) = x − x 2 ):
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier and s(x) is the softmax scores of the classifier f (x). When adapting it to feature space, we can replace the regularized term by e.g the cosine distance between the extracted features:
) with which we can solvex 1 by the same optimization procedure as before. Many other attacking algorithms in label space can be adapted to feature space in a similar way.
Figure 1: A conceptual demonstration on how adversarial attacks can be exploited to attack DNN-based biometric recognition system. Solid items: valid biometric in the database. Empty items: fake biometric constructed by adversarial attacks from the valid biometric. The dashed ellipsoids represent small T -balls in the two spaces. While the difference between the original biometric and the adversarial biometric is small in the original space, they are sufficient to cause a mismatch in the feature space.
The existence of adversarial attacks in the feature space clearly raises a prominent security problem for DNN-based recognition systems: a strategic attacker may make use of adversarial attacks to construct fake biometric from existing ones whose features are close enough to that of other users ( Figure 1 ). If this is true, the attacker can be mis-recognized as other users and be granted full authority belonging to others. It is then natural to ask how to build a feature extractor f (·) that are robust against adversarial attacks. Before answering this question, we need a principle way to measure the robustness of f (·) in the feature space, as existing robustness evaluation metric [Huang et al., 2017; Bastani et al., 2016; Carlini and Wagner, 2017] only work for the label space. Here, we suggest to quantify the robustness of f (·) by the 'hardness' of findingx 1 in (3):
(4) where X 1 and X 2 are the collection of biometric images belonging to individuals 1 and 2, n 1 , n 2 are the cardinal of X 1 and X 2 , respectively. Therefore we measure the robustness of f (·) as the minimal effort required to make the system misrecognize x 1 as x 2 and average it across all (x 1 , x 2 ) pairs. Note that H 1,2 (f ) is defined for the binary-class case but it is trivial to generalize it to multi-class case.
Our goal here is hence to design a feature extractor f (·) with high robustness index (4) but still guarantees good recognition performance. Next, we show that how this goal can be achieved by learning robust biometric features through a deep, information-theoretic framework, which is evolved from the recent deep variational information bottleneck (DVIB) framework but are augmented with two important modifications designed for biometric recognition tasks. 
Method
From an information-theoretic perspective, if the extracted features, Z, forget as much irrelevant information as possible in the input biometric X, then it shall be robust to small permutations in the inputs. On the other hand, for good recognition performance we hope that the learned features Z are still informative about Y , the identity of the biometric owner. Together, we can formulate an information-bottleneck (IB) principle [Tishby et al., 2000] for feature extraction:
Unfortunately, exact optimization of (5) is difficult due to the intractable integrals in mutual information computation. Below, we first show how to optimize (5) approximately by the recent deep variational information bottleneck framework (DVIB) [Alemi et al., 2017] , then adapt it to biometric recognition context.
Deep variational information bottleneck
Rather than optimizing (5) directly, DVIB suggests to instead optimize its variational lower bound :
where q(y|z) and q(z) are the variational approximations to the distributions p(y|z) and p(z) respectively. See [Alemi et al., 2017] for the derivation. In DVIB, these distributions are modeled as:
where the mean µ(x) and the covariance Λ(x) of p(z|x) are computed by an encoder network f with weights W f : f (x; W f ) = {µ(x), Λ(x)} (8) whereas the softmax score g k (z) in q(y = j|z) is given by another decoder network g with weights W g :
(9) The weights in the two networks f and g are then jointly learned by optimizing (6). After training, we take µ(x) in the encoder network as the features of x i.e z = µ(x).
Deep variational sphere projection
DVIB allows us to learn Z in (5) efficiently, however it is originally designed for classification tasks rather than biometric recognition. Mainstream biometric recognition solutions usually learn biometric features with a large inter-class margin explicitly so as to achieve good recognition performance in (1) (see e.g [Chopra et al., 2005] , [Schroff et al., 2015] , and [Liu et al., 2016] ). In DVIB, however, µ(x) of each classes has to stay near the origin due to the KL term in (6), making their Euclidean distance too close to each other (Figure 2 .a) and hence small inter-class margin. We introduce two important modifications to DVIB to resolve this problem.
Sphere projection. The first modification is a novel projection operation. The idea is to 'project' the features in DVIB to the surface of a hypersphere, where the projected features are allowed to have large angular margin regardless of the KL term (Figure 2.b) . The projection operation is defined as:
Therefore the new features z are on the surface of a hypersphere whose center is at the origin and has radius R. Similar to (5), we can set up an IB principle for learning Z :
whose lower bound is:
The first inequality above is given by the data processing inequality and the second inequality is given by the variational lower bound. Learning now amounts to optimizing (12) instead of (6). Here, p(z |x) is modeled as a special 'shell distribution' whose probability mass is uniformly spread on the surface of a hypersphere: and the center c(x) and radius r(x) of the hypersphere are:
The reason that why sphere projection helps in generating large-margin features is as follows. To maximize (12), the optimizer pursuits a large value for the expectation term E p(z |xi) [log q(y i |z )]. As each z ∼ p(z |x i ) in the term is randomly sampled from the surface of the hypersphere, if the centers of inter-class hyperspheres are too close to each other, those z sampled from different classes would easily crash together, leading to low log q(y|z ) values. As a consequence, the optimizer would drive the surface of these hyperspheres to be far way from each other and ultimately, resulting in a large angular margin between their centers (Figure 2.b) .
In practice, we can compute the gradient of (12) as follows. Denote W = {W f , W g } as the parameters to be optimized:
• Likelihood term. We compute it by the reparameterization trick [Kingma and Welling, 2013] . Let u ∼ U sphere (0, 1) be the sample randomly drawn from the surface of an unit sphere. Each sample z ∼ p(z |x i ) can be rewritten as:
where r and c are defined in (14). We can then rewritten the gradient of the expectation term as:
where, to obtain u ∼ U sphere (0, 1), one can simply first sample v ∼ N (0, I), then get u by u = v/ v . • KL term. This term can be computed easily since both p(z|x i ) and r(z) are Gaussian. Here, as in DVIB, we assume that the matrix Λ(x i ) in p(z|x i ) is diagonal, yielding
Unifying results from both terms yields the gradient ∇ W L .
Adversarial learning. The second modification in our model is to actively learn with extra adversarial samples. We found this strategy particularly useful for further improving the feature robustness and discrminativity when incorporating with the sphere projection operation. In this work, we construct the adversarial sample x for each training sample x by the fast gradient sign method [Goodfellow et al., 2014] :
where ∇ x L is the gradient of the learning objective w.r.t x, is a small 'permutation factor' taken as = 0.1. Therefore x is constructed such that it causes the value of the objective function to change the most quickly. In our method, the effect of learning with these adversarial samples can be understood as that they cause the hyperspheres of different classes to 'oscillate' around their initial positions. As the center of these hyperspheres can only move on the surface of a hypersphere, this makes them easily crash with each other during optimization (Figure 2.c) . To avoid this, the optimizer would have to learn to stop such oscillations as well as increases the interclass margin (Figure 2.d) . Note that the computation of ∇ x L in (15) can be done in a similar way as in ∇ W L .
Algorithm 1 DVSP Training
Output: Network weights W = {W f , W g } Hyperparamters: IB factor β, projection radius R The whole training procedure of the proposed deep variational sphere projection (DVSP) network is summarized in Algorithm 1. An overview of the full pipeline of the proposed feature extraction framework is given in Figure 3 , where we will first use pre-processing and CNN to extract preliminary features before subsequent learning. After training, we take z in (10) as the feature of x, and compare two biometrics by the cosine distance between their features. 
Experiments
This section setups a set of experiments to ascertain the effectiveness of the proposed DVSP method.
Setup
Evaluation metric. We will be using the following metrics for performance evaluation:
• Recognition performance. We assess this by the equal error rate (EER) of the features. EER is the point where the false positive rate (FPR) and the false negative rate (FNR) are equal. The FPR and FNR values are calculated as:
where n T P , n F P , n T N , n F N are the number of true positive match, false positive match, true negative match and false negative match in the database respectively. A lower EER indicates a better FPR under the same FNR and hence a better recognition performance.
• Feature robustness. This metric measures how robust the feature extractor is against adversarial attacks. We compute this metric by averaging the robustness index H k,l in (4) over all pairs of classes:
where n c is the number of different individuals (classes) in the database. For example, if there are 10 individuals, we will calculate 10×9 2 = 45 pairs of H k,l values in (17). Baselines. We will compare the proposed method with the following approaches: et al., 2017 ] is a representation learning framework that extracts robust, highly discriminative features via the IB principle. In this work we adapt DVIB from classification tasks to the context of biometric recognition and as such it serves as the predecessor of our method.
• Center-loss ] is a powerful method for face recognition. It learns large-margin features by making points in each class to collapse towards the class center.
• SphereFace [Liu et al., 2017] is another state-of-the-art method for face recognition. Similar to our method it projects the features onto the surface of a hypersphere. The difference is that it learns features by the softmax loss whereas ours is by the IB principle.
All baselines as well as the proposed method adopt the same CNN as in [Liu et al., 2017] , which is comprised of 20 layers. The IB factor β as well as the projection radius R in the proposed method are selected by 5-fold cross-validation such that it achieves the best balance between EER and RI. All neural networks are trained by Adam [Kingma and Ba, 2014] with its default settings.
Results
Experiments on MNIST dataset. We use this relatively simple dataset as a conceptual demonstration of the problem considered in this work. The MNIST dataset contains 60,000 images of hand-written digits from 0 to 9. In this experiment, we treat every digit as an individual in the biometric recognition system. Therefore there are 10 different individuals with 6,000 images for each. We use the first 50,000 samples for training and the left 10,000 for testing. Figure 4 visualizes the 'robustness heatmap' of each method in this dataset. Each entry in the heatmap represents how hard it is to cast adversarial attacks between two classes i.e the value of H k,l . A brighter color of the entry indicates a larger H k,l value and hence a higher difficulty. For example, the entry at the 4-th row and the 6-th column indicates the difficulty to attack between digit 3 and digit 5. Note that the average of the non-diagonal entries in the heatmap makes up the robustness index RI in (17). It can be seen from the heatmap that the proposed DVSP method arguably achieves better robustness than any other methods among almost all classes pairs. Most H k,l values in the proposed DVSP method are above 2 but are below 1 in other methods. This indicates that it is nearly twice difficult to cast adversarial attacks in our method. We further discover that such difficulties indeed depend on the nature of the two classes. For example, the values of H 4,9 and H 3,5 are significantly much lower than other pairs. This coincides with the prior that it requires less efforts to cast adversarial attacks between similar classes. Experiments on CASIA/LFW dataset. In this part, we further evaluate the efficacy of the proposed method on a real-world face recognition problem. In particular, we consider the case that the individuals (classes) in the training set are disjoint from that in the test set; a common situation in real-world applications. Here, the CASIA-webface dataset will serve as the training set and the LFW dataset [Huang et al., 2008] will serve as the test set. There are 494,414 images of 10,575 individuals in CASIA-webface and 13233 images of 5,749 individuals in the LFW dataset. Each of these images is pre-processed by the face alignment method [Zhang et al., 2016] before subsequent processing.
In Figure 5 , we show four groups of images x 1 , x 2 as well as their adversarial samplesx 1 ,x 2 constructed by adversarial attacks. In each group, we display the original images in the first column, their corresponding adversarial samples in each method in the middle columns, and the target images in the last column. The first row in each pair shows the case x 1 v.s x 2 whereas the second row shows the case x 2 v.s x 1 . These adversarial samples are found by the modified CarliniWanger attack described in section 2. It can be seen from the figure that the differences between the adversarial samples and their origin image are visually imperceptible in other approaches but are significant in the proposed DVSP method. The difference between the adversarial sample and the original image in DVSP is so large that it clearly deviates from natural human faces (e.g see the stripes on the faces in the 5-th columns in each group). This demonstrates that it requires much higher efforts to attack the proposed DVSP method than other methods i.e it is more robust to adversarial attacks. Table 2 further summarizes the EER and RI values of each method in this problem. Expectedly we see that the proposed DVSP achieves a better trade-off between recognition performance and feature robustness, with its RI index nearly three times higher than other methods and its EER much lower.
Conclusions
Adversarial attacks is a hot research topic in recent machine learning but has not been extensively studied within the context of biometric recognition. In this work, we extend current analysis in adversarial attacks from label space to feature space and discuss its effects on biometric recognition tasks. We discover that many state-of-the-art solutions in biometric recognition are indeed vulnerable to adversarial attacks and can be easily fooled. To defend such attacks, we develop a deep, information-theoretic framework to extract robust yet discriminative biometric features. The framework builds upon the recent deep variational information bottleneck method [Alemi et al., 2017] but is carefully adapted to biometric recognition tasks. Experiments on a toy dataset as well as a real-world face recognition problem demonstrates the efficacy of the proposed framework. To the best of our knowledge, only few works like [Duan et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2018] have considered adversarial attacks in the feature space but they have not studied the case of biometric recognition. Our work thus broadens the research scope of adversarial attacks and biometric recognition and suggests new research directions in both these fields.
Throughout our work, we mainly focus on the L 2 attack case where we measure the similarity between the adversarial sample and the original image by their Euclidean distance. It is therefore of great interest to generalize our analysis to other cases such as L 0 attack [Papernot et al., 2016] and L ∞ attack [Warde-Farley and Goodfellow, 2016] for completeness. Another direction worth exploration is to test the effectiveness of the proposed framework on other biometric modalities not dealt with herein, including irises, voices and fingerprints.
